Developments in the Law,  Nonprofit Corporations  (III. Tax Exemption) by Jones, Renee M.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
January 1992
Developments in the Law, "Nonprofit
Corporations" (III. Tax Exemption)
Renee M. Jones
Boston College Law School, renee.jones.2@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Renee M. Jones. "Developments in the Law, "Nonprofit Corporations" (III. Tax Exemption)." Harvard Law Review 105, no.7 (1992):
1612-1633.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
They provide a solid model for nonprofit directors and have been
embraced by the leading statutes that govern nonprofit activities.120
Equally important, yet less often discussed by commentators, are
the procedures used to enforce the fiduciary duties. More effective
enforcement procedures would enable states to apply the business
standards of care and loyalty to nonprofit directors.
In the context of mutual benefit nonprofits, enforcement of fidu-
ciary duties should be left to the corporation's members. The members
should have the same rights as shareholders of business corporations,
and member derivative actions should not be burdened by require-
ments not typically applied to shareholder actions. 121 Successful de-
rivative actions should yield the same benefits obtainable by share-
holders (limited, of course, by the nondistribution constraint applied
to nonprofits).
The appropriate enforcement mechanism is more problematic in
the context of public benefit corporations. Instead of simply relaxing
existing standing requirements, state legislatures should enact more
powerful penalties for breaches of the fiduciary duties. Because of
the underenforcement problem present in the nonprofit sector, a sys-
tem of fines appropriately complements the disgorgement of imper-
missible profits. Such fines, however, should be used only for breaches
of the duty of loyalty, when the director is presumably aware that he
is engaging in a prohibited transaction. The fines must also be ap-
propriately limited so as not to deter permissible activities undertaken
by risk averse directors.
III. TAx EXEMPTION
A. Introduction
Many nonprofit organizations are exempt from various forms of
taxation under federal and state law. In a debate that has largely
focused on the commercial activity of nonprofits, many academics and
tax analysts have openly questioned the merits of these exemptions.
The central question posed is whether organizations with the ability
to generate profits merit public subsidy.
Framing the debate is a lack of consensus regarding the rationale
for tax exemption. Some commentators have observed that both the
Treasury Department and the courts have administered the tax ex-
emption for nonprofits in a haphazard and inconsistent manner.1 In
120 See supra pp. 1593-94.
121 Such requirements, which should be rejected, include a threshold number of members
who must initiate the derivative action. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
I See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals:
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. Rlv. 307, 3IO-i3 (I99I); Henry
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response to this apparent disarray, some have sought to develop a
rationale that both explains the current system and offers guidance
for reform. Unfortunately, much of the academic commentary on tax
exemption has understated the significance of local government action
to revoke the property tax exemption for certain types of nonprofits.
Because of the significant and tangible value of the local property
tax exemption, local authorities have begun to challenge the exempt
status of nonprofit organizations. Most of the litigation over the prop-
erty tax exemption has revolved around interpreting the elusive term
"charitable," upon which much of tax exemption law hinges. An
examination of this conflict at the state level offers more guidance
than exclusively focusing upon the positions of the IRS and the hold-
ings of federal courts.
This Part argues that the most appropriate way to determine
whether an organization is charitable for tax exemption purposes is
by reference to community values. Section B lays out the current law
of tax exemption at the federal and state levels. Section C discusses
the conventional rationale for tax exemption, and introduces several
theories that seek to provide a more rigorous explanation of the ex-
emption. Section D argues that state courts should more frequently
defer to local government action regarding property tax exemption,
and that federal policymakers should be guided by such local activity.
Finally, section E analyzes the debate over tax exemption for nonprofit
hospitals, both to provide an illustration of the importance of local
government activity and to demonstrate how the proposed judicial
analysis can be applied in a specific case.
B. Overview of Basic Exemption Schemes
Charitable nonprofit organizations are exempt from federal income
taxation under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. In addition,
the Code entitles qualifying charitable entities to receive tax deductible
contributions from donors, 2 and to issue bonds for which the interest
accrued is excluded from the investor's taxable income. 3 Furthermore,
organizations that qualify as charitable under state constitutional or
statutory provisions are exempt from state income and local property
tax.
.T. Federal Income Tax Exemption. - Not all nonprofit organi-
zations are exempt from the federal income tax.4 Section 50I(a) limits
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Tax-
ation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 54 (198).
2 See I.R.C. § 170(a), (c) (1988); infra Part IV.
3 See I.R.C. §§ io3, 141(e)(i)(g) (1988).
4 See Hansmann, supra note i, at 57 & n.15.
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the exemption to specifically prescribed entities.5 Organizations de-
scribed in section 5o1(c)(3), including those organized for "religious,
charitable, scientific . . . or educational purposes," constitute the
majority of the organizations that benefit from the exemption. 6 Be-
cause most organizations receiving the exemption qualify under the
section 501(c)(3) charitable exemption, the reach of that section is the
focus of this analysis.
To qualify for tax exemption under section 5oi(c)(3) an organiza-
tion nust satisfy both the organizational and operational tests de-
scribed in treasury regulation section I.5oI(c)(3)-I. Thus, the orga-
nization must be "both organized and operated exclusively for the
furtherance of one or more of the purposes" enumerated in
section 501(c)(3). 7
(a) Organizational Test. - To satisfy the organizational test, the
articles of organization (for example, trust instruments, corporate
charters, or articles of association) must limit an organization's pur-
poses to one or more of the listed exempt purposes, and must not
expressly empower the organization (except to an insubstantial degree)
to engage in any activities that are not in furtherance of an exempt
purpose. 8 Further, the articles of organization must provide for the
distribution of assets for a public or charitable purpose upon disso-
lution of the organization. 9
(b) Operational Test. - Even if its articles of organization conform
to the requirements of the organizational test, the organization must
also satisfy the operational test. The regulations state that "[a]n or-
ganization will be regarded as 'operated exclusively' for one or more
exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which ac-
complish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section
501(c)(3)." 10 Activities other than those that further an exempt pur-
pose are permissible. However, an organization will not be regarded
as operating exclusively for exempt purposes "if more than an insub-
stantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt pur-
pose."ll
5 See I.R.C. § 5oi(a) (1988).
6 I.R.C. § 5oi(c)(3) (1988). More precisely, section 5oi(c)(3) defines charitable tax-exempt
organizations as "[clorporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only
if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals." Id. Other organizations exempt under § 501
include civic organizations, labor or agricultural organizations, pension plans, chambers of
commerce, and fraternal beneficiary societies. See I.R.C. § 5oi(c)(4)-(Io) (1988).
7 Treas. Reg. § i.5oI(c)(3)-I(a)(I) (as amended in x99o).
8 See Treas. Reg. § i.Sox(c)(3)-i(b)(i)(i) (as amended in i9go).
9 See Treas. Reg. § 1.5oI(c)(3)-I(b)(4) (as amended in 19go).
10 Treas. Reg. § i.soi(c)(3)-i(c)(i) (as amended in I9go).
11 Id.; see infra p. 1617.
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(c) Exempt Purpose. - (i) Specified Exempt Purposes. - Although
section 5o1(c)(3) authorizes a variety of qualifying exempt purposes,' 2
the most common include educational, religious and charitable. De-
fining the scope of activities deemed to further such purposes is the
most contested aspect of tax exemption law. As defined in the regu-
lations, education relates to "[t]he instruction or training of the indi-
vidual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities [and
the] instruction of the public on subjects useful and beneficial to the
community."1 3 The regulations specify that an educational organiza-
tion may advocate a particular position as long as it "presents a
sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts." An orga-
nization, however, is not considered educational "if its principal func-
tion is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion."'14 Attempting
to distinguish educational material from mere propaganda has em-
broiled the IRS in constitutional controversy. In Big Mama Rag, Inc.
v. United States,'5 the D.C. Circuit held that the full and fair expo-
sition test was unconstitutionally vague and violated the First Amend-
ment. 16 However, other circuits have not followed Big Mama Rag,17
and the D.C. Circuit showed less sympathy for an analogous claim
when it ruled in National Alliance v. United States'5 that an orga-
nization that published racist propaganda could not sustain a valid
First Amendment challenge to the same IRS regulation.19 The court
determined that the group's purposes could not satisfy "any definition
of 'educational' conceivably intended by Congress. "20
Religion is specifically designated an exempt purpose by
section 5o1(c)(3). Because of the constitutional separation of church
and state, it may be difficult to advance a direct challenge to an
organization's claim to be organized and operated for religious pur-
poses. Thus, the IRS must be careful not to discriminate against any
religious group in the administration of tax exemptions. 21 However,
12 See supra note 6.
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.50I(c)(3)-i(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 199o). Examples of educational orga-
nizations include primary and secondary schools, colleges, universities, trade and professional
schools, and organizations that present public forums or lectures, or correspondence courses.
Also included as educational are museums, zoos, planetariums, symphony orchestras and similar
organizations. See Treas. Reg. § I.5o1(c)(3)-I(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in 199o).
14 Treas. Reg. I-50I(c)(3)-i(d)(3)(i)(b) (as amended in 199o).
Is 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. I98O).
16 See id. at 1039-40.
17 See Martha H. Good, Recent Case, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 277, 294 (1984) (noting that the
D.C. Circuit "stands virtually alone .. . in its view that the Treasury regulation's definition of
'educational' is unconstitutionally vague").
1s 71o F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
19 See id. at 875.
20 Id. at 873.
21 See generally Trevor A. Brown, Note, Religious Nonprofits and the Commercial Manner
Test, 99 YALE L.J. 5631, 1639 (599 o ) ("[O]nly the religious exemption presents the possibility of
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the IRS has revoked the exempt status of religious organizations when
the organization conferred private benefits on its members, 22 or when
the organization did not serve an exclusively religious purpose. 23
The law of tax exemption cannot be understood without inter-
preting the term charitable. The term implies both a statutory defi-
nition of a category of exempt activities, and a common law require-
ment that the organization must advance charitable ends. The first
meaning of charitable is, as previously noted, reflected in the Code's
enumeration of certain specific categories of activities that presumably
justify exemption. The term "charitable," as used in section 501(c)(3),
is a catch-all phrase encompassing all activities that, although not
specified in the subsection, can reasonably be claimed to serve a
charitable purpose. 24 Unfortunately, neither the statute nor the reg-
ulations explicitly define "charitable." According to the treasury reg-
ulations, the term "charitable" is used "in its generally accepted legal
sense . . . [and includes] [r]elief of the poor . . . ; advancement of
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance
of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens
of Government; and promotion of social welfare. '25 This list, how-
ever, does not purport to be exhaustive.
Concerning the second use of "charitable," the Supreme Court has
held that all organizations exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3)
must be charitable in practice, regardless of their specifically enum-
erated purpose. In Bob Jones University v. United States,26 the Court
held that, "underlying all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that
entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law
standards of charity - namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt
status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established
public policy."2 7 For example, discrimination on the basis of race
violates public policy, and will deprive an otherwise charitable edu-
cational organization of exempt status. 28 Similarly, evidence of en-
gaging in illegal activity jeopardizes an organization's exempt status.29
infringements on the constitutional norms against entanglement of government and religion, free
religious exercise, and government establishment of religion." (footnotes omitted)).
22 See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310, 1322 (9th Cir. 1987)
(upholding the revocation of an organization's exempt status on the grounds that the organiza-
tion's income inured to the benefit of founder and his family), cert denied, 488 U.S. IOiS (1988).
23 See Smith v. Commissioner, 8oo F.2d 930, 934-35 (gth Cir. I986); First Libertarian Church
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 396, 404 (1980).
24 The term "charitable" is "not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration in
section 5oz(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of
'charity' as developed by judicial decisions." Treas. Reg. § 1.Soi(c)(3)-I(a)(2) (as amended in
I990).
25 Id.
26 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
27 Id. at 586.
28 See id. at 595 ("[R]acial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy.").
29 See, e.g., Synanon Church v. United States, 82o F.2d 42I, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding
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(ii) Commercial Activity. - Engaging in commercial activity does
not preclude an organization from being deemed to serve an exempt
purpose. However, the commercial activity cannot constitute the or-
ganization's primary purpose. Income generated from commercial ac-
tivity that is unrelated to the organization's exempt purpose may be
subject to the unrelated business income tax.
The IRS carefully scrutinizes the activities of nonprofit organiza-
tions engaging in commercial activity. If an organization charges
consumers a price covering more than the full cost of its product or
service, the alleged charitable nature of the activity is called into
question. For example, a nonprofit pharmacy organized and operated
to sell prescription drugs to the elderly at a modest discount was
denied tax-exempt status. 30 Similarly, income earned by a consulting
firm organized to advise other nonprofits at fees set to cover more
than costs was held to be taxable. 3 1 The fact that a nonprofit com-
petes directly with for-profit entities is often cited as evidence that
exemption is not warranted. 3 2
(iii) Unrelated Business Income Tax. - A nonprofit's exemption
from federal income tax is limited to income derived from activity
substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose. Income
derived from unrelated activities is subject to the unrelated business
income tax.3 3 The rationale underlying the unrelated business income
tax is to limit unfair competition between for-profit businesses and
tax-exempt nonprofits. 34
Unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) is the "gross income
derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business...
regularly carried on by it, less the deductions . . . directly connected
with the carrying on of such trade or business. '35 Unrelated trade or
business means "any trade or business the conduct of which is not
substantially related . . . to the exercise or performance by such
organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function
constituting the basis for its exemption. '3 6 Exceptions to this general
provision cover work performed by volunteers, 37 revenue from busi-
ness conducted for the convenience of the nonprofit's members or
that evidence regarding a group's incitement and perpetration of violence and illegal acts is
relevant for determining its tax-exempt status).
30 See Federation Pharmacy Serv. v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 804, 809 (8th Cir. 198o).
31 See B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 36o-6i (1978).
32 See, e.g., id. at 358.
33 See I.R.C. §§ 51'-514 (West Supp. 1991).
34 See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 1o5, 114 (1986).
35 I.R.C. § 512(a)(i) (West Supp. i99i). Passive investment income, including dividends,
interest, payments with respect to securities loans, royalties, and rents from real property, is
excluded from UBTI. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(i)-(3) (1988).
36 I.R.C. § 513(a) (988).
37 See I.R.C. § 513(a)(i) (1988).
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employees, 3 8 sale of donated goods, 3 9 certain hospital services, 4 0 and
certain activities of conventions and trade shows. 4 1
The law has not yet clearly resolved when income received by
exempt organizations should be considered UBTI. 42 The regulations
set out the three factors to be considered in determining whether
income should be taxed as UBTI. Revenue is includable in UBTI if,
") it is income from a trade or business; 2) such trade or business is
regularly carried on by the organization; and 3) the conduct of such
trade or business is not substantially related ... to the organization's
performance of its exempt functions." 43
The term trade or business, as used in section 513, means any ac-
tivity carried on to produce income from the sale of goods or the per-
formance of services. 44 Regularly carried on activities are those that
"manifest a frequency and continuity, and are pursued in a manner,
generally similar to comparable commercial activities of nonexempt
organizations." 45  To constitute a substantially related activity, the
commercial activity from which the income is derived must "contribute
importantly" to accomplishing the exempt charitable purpose. 4 6
(iv) General Prohibitions. - In addition to meeting the specific
criteria enumerated above, an organization must abide by two addi-
tional general prohibitions in order to qualify for tax exemption. Re-
gardless of its particular purpose, no organization can be granted tax-
exempt status if part of its earnings inure to the benefit of private
38 See I.R.C. § 513(a)(2) (1988).
39 See I.R.C. § 513(a)(3) (1988).
40 See I.R.C. § 513(e) (1988).
41 See I.R.C. § 513(d) (1988).
42 See generally Marcus S. Owens, Current Developments in the Unrelated Business Area
-IRS Perspective, 4 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 923 (ggI) (detailing the complex factors involved
in determining when a nonprofit's revenues are unrelated business taxable income).
43 Treas. Reg. § I.5I3-1(a) (as amended in 1983).
44 See I.R.C. § 513(c) (1988). Trade or business has the same meaning as used in § 162 of
the Code. See Owens, supra note 42, at 925. In United States v. American Bar Endowment,
477 U.S. io5 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the sale of life insurance was a "trade or
business" within the meaning of § 512, see id. at rio. The Court held that, because the
insurance business competed with other for-profit vendors of insurance, Congress intended that
such revenue should be taxed. See id. at 114.
45 Treas. Reg. § I.513-I(c)(I) (as amended in 1983); see also NCAA v. Commissioner, 914
F.2d 1417, 1424 (ioth Cir. 199o) (holding that revenue generated from the sale of advertising
in basketball tournament programs was not UBTI because the activity was not sufficiently long
lasting to constitute a regularly carried on trade or business).
46 See Treas. Reg. § I.513-i(d)(2) (as amended in 1983); see also American Postal Workers
Union v. United States, 925 F.2d 480, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. I99I) (holding that revenue from dues
paid by nonmembers to purchase health insurance was UBTI because helping nonmembers was
not a part the organization's stated purpose); National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 310, 324 (I99o) (finding that the provision of benefits to "limited benefit"
members who were not postal supervisors was not substantially related to organization's exempt
purpose), aff'd, 944 F.2d 859 (Fed. Cir. i99i).
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shareholders. 47 This prohibition of private inurement is not limited
to the distribution of dividends, but also applies to the conferral of
any direct or indirect benefit to a private interest. 48
The Code specifically provides that a section 501(c)(3) organization
must not carry on propaganda, attempt to influence legislation, or
participate or intervene in political campaigns. 49 The regulations de-
fine any organization that violates this provision as an "action orga-
nization" that is not exempt from income taxation.50
2. Tax Exemption and State Law. - All states with a corporate
tax provide an exemption for nonprofit charitable organizations. 51 In
administering the corporate income tax exemption, most states simply
follow federal practice either by granting a statutory exemption to any
organization exempt under section 501(c)(3), or by using statutory
language similar to that used in the Code without specific reference
to it. 52
Real and personal property that is owned by nonprofit charitable
organizations and is used for a charitable purpose is also exempt from
taxation under state constitutional and statutory provisions. 53 To
qualify for property tax exemption under most state schemes, an
organization must, at a minimum, meet two organizational require-
ments. First, the entity must be organized as a nonprofit that pays
out no dividends or income other than wages. Second, its assets must
be irrevocably committed to serving charitable purposes. 54 In addi-
tion, the property in question must be used primarily for an exempt
purpose that benefits an indefinite, non-exclusive class of people. 55
47 See Treas. Reg. § i.5oi(c)(3)-i(d)(i)(ii) (as amended in i99o), supra Part II.
48 See Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d i31o, 1316 (gth Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1O15 (1988); Harding Hosp. Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d io68, 1072 (6th
Cir. 1974). Recently, the IRS promulgated a General Counsel Memorandum that announced
that hospitals may jeopardize their tax-exempt status by forming joint ventures with doctors
through which doctors are rewarded for referring patients to hospitals, because such arrange-
ments violate the prohibition on private inurement. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21,
1991); Joint Ventures with Doctors May Jeopardize Hospitals' Exempt Status 53 TAx NOTES
1129, 1130 (1991).
49 See I.R.C. § 5o1(c)(3) (1988).
50 See Treas. Reg. §I.5o1(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 199o). For a discussion of the
constitutional implications of the prohibition against political activity, see infra Part V.
51 See W. HARRISON WELLFORD & JANNE G. GALLAGHER, UNFAIR COMPETITION? THE
CHALLENGE TO CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 121 (1988).
52 See id. at 121-22; see also id. app. A (providing a state-by-state analysis of tax exemptions
for nonprofits).
S3 Thirty-six states have constitutional provisions that either guarantee exemption or permit
the legislature to grant an exemption at its discretion. The remaining state constitutions expressly
permit the legislature to grant property tax exemptions for any reason or have been interpreted
to allow for exemption. See id. at 122.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 123-25.
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The property tax exemption differs from income tax exemption in
that it is granted by the state, yet the impact from lost revenues falls
upon local governmental entities. If a state legislature authorizes an
exemption broader than one deemed appropriate by municipal offi-
cials, courts must frequently mediate the conffict.
C. Rationale for Tax Exemption
Commentators have offered a number of theoretical frameworks
to explain the tax exemption for nonprofits. None of these theories,
however, satisfactorily explain the tax exemption system. It is helpful,
however, to begin with Professor Henry Hansmann's distinction be-
tween donative nonprofits and commercial nonprofits.5 6 Donative
nonprofits receive most of their income from donations. Examples
include CARE, the Salvation Army, and the United Way. In contrast,
commercial nonprofits, such as the Educational Testing Service, nurs-
ing homes, and hospitals, receive most of their income from prices
charged for the goods and services they provide. 57 The law treats
commercial nonprofits as the more suspect form of nonprofit for mer-
iting tax exemption. 58 Thus, much of the debate regarding the non-
profit tax exemption focuses on the exemption of commercial non-
profits and attempts to explain why some commercial nonprofits
deserve subsidy while others do not.
i. Conventional Rationale. - The subsidy theory is the traditional
rationale for the tax exemption. Courts often opine that tax exemption
is a means for providing a government subsidy to organizations that
relieve governmental burdens by providing essential services.5 9 De-
spite its general acceptance, the subsidy rationale is an incomplete
explanation for tax exemption. Even if one accepted that the provi-
sion of certain goods and services deserves to be subsidized, it remains
unclear why a subsidy should be granted through the tax system rather
than through direct subsidies or government provision of the goods or
services in question.
Viewing the nonprofit tax exemption as a tax expenditure invites
an examination of the propriety of providing government subsidies
through the tax system. Tax expenditures "represent government
spending for favored activities or groups, effected through the tax
system." 60 The list of tax expenditures includes well recognized pref-
erences to individual taxpayers, such as the home mortgage interest
56 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 840-
41 (Ig8o).
57 See id.
58 See supra p. 1617.
59 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (z983); Rob Atkinson,
Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REv. 501, 6o6 & n.292 (1990).
60 STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAx EXPENDITURES 3 (1985).
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deduction, the property tax deduction, and the deduction for charita-
ble contributions. 6 1
Critics of tax expenditures point to the inefficiency of tax expen-
ditures in allocating scarce government resources. They note an "up-
side-down" effect, by which those least in need of assistance benefit
from tax subsidies the most.62 In the case of tax exemptions, clear
distributional inequities exist. Only organizations with significant net
profits or that own valuable property, benefit from a tax break. 63
Furthermore, embedding substantive policy programs in the tax
system forces ill-equipped tax administrators and legislative tax com-
mittees to make substantive policy decisions. 64 Congressional spend-
ing eludes proper scrutiny by substantive policy committees whenever
Congress includes such spending programs in tax legislation. Simi-
larly, this practice forces the IRS to make substantive policy decisions
when formulating regulations that interpret legislation. 65
Tax expenditure analysis reveals the weakness of the subsidy the-
ory as a rationale for tax exemption. However, the tax expenditure
concept provides no basis for proceeding with the exemption as it
exists, because tax expenditure critique fails to inform policy makers
and administrators of how to administer the tax exemption.
2. Academic Theories. - Although the subsidy theory comports
with common sense, it is an imprecise and inadequate tool for ana-
lyzing tax exemption. A number of commentators have sought to
develop a more rigorous theory to justify tax exemption and to pre-
scribe its proper scope.
(a) Income Measurement Theory. - Boris Bittker and George
Rahdert offered one of the first academic attempts to provide a more
coherent explanation of the income tax exemption. 66 In their view,
nonprofits are exempted from income taxation because there is no
practical way to measure their net income. 67 The authors point to
difficulties in defining income and deductible expenses for nonprofit
groups. For example, they question whether membership dues or
donations to nonprofit organizations should be counted as gifts, which
61 See id. at 77-79.
62 See id. at 71-82.
63 See Hall & Colombo, supra note i, at 355-57.
64 See SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 6o, at xo6.
65 See id. at 95-96. For example, the IRS implicitly sanctioned the practice of patient
dumping by nonprofit hospitals when it ruled in 1969 that hospitals were no longer required to
treat all patients regardless of their ability to pay. See Daniel C. Schaffer & Daniel M. Fox,
Tax Administration as Health Policy: The Exemption of Nonprofit Hospitals, 1969-r99o, 53
TAX NOTES 217, 218 (i991) (discussing how Revenue Ruling 69-545 removed an obstacle to
"patient dumping" by nonprofit hospitals).
66 See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
67 See id. at 333.
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are not includable as income under the tax code, or as taxable reve-
nue. 68 Also, given the redistributive function served by many non-
profit organizations, they argue that it is unclear whether the services
and goods they provide would be considered deductible expenses,
which, under the Code, must be motivated by a desire for profit. 69
Although the income measurement theory provides some insights
into the nonprofit tax exemption, the theory has several problems.
First, not all nonprofits rely on donations for revenue. Many generate
income through the sales of goods and services in a manner similar
to for-profit companies. In the case of commercial nonprofits, it would
be easy to adopt the tax accounting rules that apply to for-profit
corporations.7° With donative nonprofits there is also a feasible way
of measuring income. Hansmann argues that donations from the
public can be viewed as implied contracts for the delivery of goods
and services to needy people. 71 For example, he asserts that sending
money to CARE for famine relief is analogous to sending money to
Tiffany's for the store to send a wedding gift to a friend. 72 Donations
from the public, construed as "purchases" of aid for the needy, could
be included in gross income, and the costs of providing the services
could be construed as deductible business expenses. 73 Finally, the
income measurement theory does not address property tax exemption,
for there is no measurement problem with valuing the property owned
by a nonprofit organization. 74
(b) Capital Formation. - In response to the perceived weaknesses
of Bittker's and Rahdert's theory, Hansmann has offered a rationale
that justifies the income tax exemption as a mechanism that compen-
sates nonprofit organizations for the constraints they face in capital
markets.75 He notes that a definitional characteristic shared by non-
profits is the nondistribution constraint, which prohibits the organi-
zation from distributing its earnings to shareholders. 76 Because non-
profits cannot issue ownership shares, they lack access to equity
markets, a common source of capital. Moreover, nonprofit organiza-
tions suffer from inadequate access to debt financing. 77 In the absence
of some type of preference or subsidy, nonprofits might face under-
capitalization. The income tax exemption enables nonprofits to fi-
nance growth through retained earnings, and primarily because re-
68 See id. at 308-09.
69 See id. at 310.
70 See Hansmann, supra note i, at 59-6I.
71 See id. at 61-62.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 61.
74 See Hall & Colombo, supra note i, 386.
7S See Hansmann, supra note i, at 72.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 73.
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tained earnings (or capital goods obtained from retained earnings) can
serve as security for loans, they thereby expand nonprofits' access to
debt financing.
Hansmann has also argued that nonprofits are the most efficient
providers of goods and services that are commonly subject to contract
failure. 78 Contract failure occurs when "consumers" cannot readily
compare services before "purchase," or cannot adequately evaluate
performance, as may occur in the case of home nursing care and day
care services. 79 Hansmann argues that tax exemption may encourage
the development of nonprofit firms in industries characterized by con-
tract failure.3 0 He concludes by recommending that the exemption
should be limited to industries in which nonprofits are undercapital-
ized and in which an economic rationale exists for preferring nonprofit
providers. 8'
Critics have pointed out that Hansmann's theory ignores concepts
of charity and philanthropy that are the intuitive bases for the ex-
emption. 82 Hansmann's theory also lacks historical consistency. He
offers no evidence of congressional intent that tax exemption should
serve as a subsidy to capital formation. 83 Finally, like the income
measurement theory, Hansmann's theory fails to address the property
tax exemption. In fact, the property tax exemption operates in a
manner inverse to Hansmann's theory. Organizations with the most
property have the least need to raise capital, yet they receive the
greatest amount of subsidy.84
(c) Donative theory. - More recently, Mark Hall and John Col-
ombo have offered a refined theory that builds on the works discussed
above. 85 They argue that "the primary rationale for the charitable
exemption is to subsidize those organizations capable of attracting a
78 See Hansmann, supra note 56, at 868-72.
79 See Hansmann, supra note i, at 69-7I.
80 See id. at 74.
81 Hansmann questions the merit of the exemption for nonprofit hospitals because they tend
to be overcapitalized. See id. at 75.
82 See Hall & Colombo, supra note x, at 389 ("[Hansmann's] theory ignores the statutory
language by failing to develop a workable definition of charity; the only concept it offers is
those socially valuable nonprofits that suffer a comparative disadvantage in capital markets.").
Atkinson has sought to justify the tax exemption as an appropriate reward for altruistic impulses.
He argues that, when an potentially profitable organization is established on a nonprofit basis,
it embodies altruism, see Atkinson, supra note 59, at 553, and that the governments should
encourage such altruism by exempting the entity from taxation, see id. at 629. Atkinson's theory
would lead to an extremely broad exemption, and, although the author acknowledges this, see
Rob Atkinson, Theories of Federal Income Tax Exemption For Charities 37, 41 (1995) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file at the Harvard Law School Library), he does not attempt to justify
the associated expense, see Atkinson, supra note 59, at 628.
8 See Hall & Colombo, supra note i, at 388-89.
84 See id. at 388.
85 See id. at 390 & n.300.
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substantial level of donative support from the public. " 86 They propose
a "donative theory," whereby the exemption would be limited to those
nonprofits that attract substantial donative support
8 7
The authors argue that tax exemption is an appropriate response
to a problem they identify as a "twin failure." The first is a market
failure resulting from the free rider problem inherent in the provision
of public goods.8 8 Private markets are unlikely to produce an optimal
supply of public goods because no one has the incentive to pay for
his or her fair share of the benefit.
The second failure is government's failure to provide an adequate
supply of certain public goods due to the vagaries of majoritarian
voting.89 Government can supply public goods through its coercive
taxing power. However, certain voting blocs lack the voting strength
to force the government to meet their public good needs, thus limiting
the ability of government to meet the needs of all of its citizens. The
authors argue that private donations to nonprofit organizations dem-
onstrate the existence of both a demand for such organizations' ser-
vices as well as an undersupply of those services by the government.
A government subsidy in this context is warranted because voluntary
donations will never meet the real public demand, due to the free
rider problem.90 The authors recommend (for hospitals, at least) a
threshold level of 30% funding through donations to qualify for tax
exemption. 9 1 Under Hall's and Colombo's theory many important
currently-exempt organizations would not merit exemption. For ex-
ample, the authors argue that nonprofit hospitals do not merit tax
exemption.92
The donative theory is promising. One strength is that the theory
seeks to explain all forms of tax exemption, including both the income
tax and the property tax. It recognizes the teachings of tax expendi-
ture analysis by focusing on the public spending aspects of the tax
exemption. Moreover, it treats the level of public donations as an
approximate measure of public support for the activity.
However, one problem with the theory lies in its inherent arbi-
trariness in setting the threshold level of donations necessary to qualify
for tax-exempt status. In addition, under Hall's and Colombo's theory
only those individuals with money are allowed to "vote" through their
86 Id. at 390.
97 See id. at 316.
88 Public goods are characterized by durability and indivisibility - once produced, it is
impossible to prevent others from benefiting from the good. Classic examples include national
defense and pollution control.
89 See id. at 391-93.
9o See id. at 394.
91 See id. at 409.
92 See id. at 411.
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donations. Furthermore, intensity of support is not necessarily com-
mensurate with amount of donation. The number of different donors
may be a better indication of public support than the percentage of
revenues from donations. Thus, the donative theory urges reliance
upon an imprecise measure of the level of public support.
D. Refinement: Lessons from Local Governments
The above-mentioned approaches for determining which institu-
tions merit tax exemption are unsatisfactory. What is needed is a
determination that rests upon the level of public support for the
category of activity in which the particular organization engages. If
the public supports a given category of activity, the inquiry should
then turn to whether a particular institution meets an objective stan-
dard to fall within a supported category. If one accepts the premise
that public spending should reflect the public will, then local govern-
ments' decisions concerning property tax exemption should be a good
indicator of the level of public support that a particular activity
enjoys.
In many instances, local governments have forcefully acted to
reject the charitable characterization of certain traditionally exempt
activities. Some municipalities have successfully negotiated agree-
ments with prominent nonprofit landowners for voluntary payments
in lieu of taxes. 93 In the absence of such agreements, some munici-
palities have unilaterally revoked the exemption of formerly untaxed
property. 94 This activism has generally been rejected by state courts,
but in recent years a few municipalities have won court approval for
reinstating the taxable status of previously exempt organizations. 95
Most of the activity has been related to hospitals, but municipalities
have also targeted other institutions that have lacked a charitable
purpose. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the state
revenue department's decision to deny the property tax exemption of
two fitness centers operated by the YMCA. 96 If municipalities do not
find charity in the operation of these institutions, it may be because
charity is absent. 97
93 See, e.g., Bill Premo, Tax Exempt Land Hurts City, CAMBRIDGE TAB, Dec. 17, 1991, at
14 ("In 1991, Harvard and MIT, two of the biggest landowners in the city, paid the city a
combined gift of $1.9 million."); R.E. Stouffer, 3 Tax-Exempts Pay City Fee, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 1988, § io, at 17 (reporting that a partnership of nonprofit hospitals and the University of
Pittsburgh will pay the city of Pittsburgh more than $ui million over the next io years).
94 See sources cited infra note 132.
95 See infra pp. 1631-32.
96 See YMCA v. Department of Revenue, 784 P.2d. io86, 1087-88 (Or. 1989).
97 See, e.g., Burlington, Vt., Divided by Mayor's Tax Mission, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 18, 1987,
at 56 (quoting then-Mayor Bernard Sanders as saying that "[t]he bottom line is that any
institution should be eligible for tax exemption if the people of a community want it to be").
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Examples of efforts to limit the scope of the tax exemption abound.
In addition to the debate in the academic literature, there have been
judicial challenges to IRS rulings, 98 congressional initiatives to limit
the scope of exemption,99 and local government activity. 100 Yet only
at the local level has there been significant progress in putting these
arguments into practice by revoking the exemption of organizations
that do not sufficiently contribute to the community. 10 1 The same
arguments that result in inaction on the federal and state levels and
in the courts are leading to policy changes in localities.
i. Why Local Government Can Better Determine What is Char-
itable. - Many organizations qualify for exemptions as charitable
organizations under both section 5o1(c)(3) of the Code and relevant
state provisions. However, there is no clear understanding of the
meaning of the term "charitable." In the case of tax exemption, the
activity at the local level sheds valuable light on the question of what
is a charitable activity. This Part argues that when concerted local
opposition exists to subsidizing an organization through tax exemption,
such opposition probably reflects the public's perception that the or-
ganization is not fulfilling its charitable purpose. It further argues
that Congress and the courts should take such judgments into account
in determining whether a nonprofit qualifies as a charitable organi-
zation.
Both the costs of exemption and the benefits derived from the
subsidized activity are clearest at the local level. Moreover, it is at
the local level that the voice of the people can be most clearly heard. 102
The myriad of essential services that must be funded through local
taxation include schools, public works, and police and fire protection.
However, the effect of nonprofits' tax exempt-status dramatically re-
duces the taxable property base, and, the greater the proportion of
property that is exempt from taxation, the greater the tax burden on
each individual property owner.
98 See infra p. 1630.
99 See infra p. 1631.
loo See supra p. 1625.
101 Although in 1986 Congress withdrew the tax exemption for commercial-type insurance
programs such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, see I.R.C. § 5oI(m) (1988); Hall & Colombo, supra
note I, at 401, this amendment, like the enactment of the unrelated business income tax merely
demonstrates that organized business interests can galvanize Congress to modify the tax laws to
limit what businesses perceive as unfair competition by nonprofits. Cf. Henry B. Hansmann,
Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REv. 6o5, 6o5-o6 (I989)
(describing the business community's advocacy for the unrelated business income tax).
102 Many political theorists have written on the virtues of community decisionmaking. See,
e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 62-63 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969); EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, THE ENDs OF HUMAN LIFE 156-62 (1991);
GERALD E. FRUG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW xv, 376 (1988); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, io68-70 (i98o) [hereinafter Frug, The City].
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By contrast, at the national level, it is difficult to quantify the
costs of income tax exemption. Because there are no standardized
accounting practices for nonprofit organizations, it is unclear how
much surplus income exists that might be taxed.103 In addition, there
are no figures in the tax expenditure budget concerning the cost of
the charitable exemption. 10 4 Most importantly, the costs of the ex-
emption are so diffuse that no particular taxpayer is likely to feel
unduly burdened by the exemption, even when many undeserving
institutions receive tax exemptions.
Just as the costs of exemption are more immediate at the local
level, local governments are best able to monitor exempt organizations
to ensure that they provide a public benefit. Feedback from com-
munity residents as to the benefits the public actually receives en-
hances this monitoring ability. In the context of hospitals, for exam-
ple, local officials are more likely than federal officials to be aware of
a nonprofit hospital's refusal to treat Medicaid or uninsured patients.
Moreover individual citizens are better able to organize at the local
level to voice effective support for - or against - the exemption of
a given category of activity. The influence of organized interest groups
at the national level tends to drown out the diffuse interests of con-
cerned, but comparatively unorganized, individuals. Abstract argu-
ments for exempting broad categories of institutions based upon in-
tangible benefits, such as the promotion of health or physical fitness,
can be persuasive only when they are not properly compared with the
concrete costs of exemption. For example, the American Hospital
Association has been an influential voice in the defense of the exemp-
tion of nonprofit hospitals. 10 5 National interest groups intervene at
the local level, 10 6 but individuals and local officials are better able to
organize and to neutralize their impact.
2. Weighing the Local Voice. - A difficult issue remaining is
what weight the courts should give to the views of local government
actors, whose motivation may often be simply to raise more revenues
in the face of a shrinking tax base. Courts cannot blindly rubber-
stamp local revocations of property tax exemptions. Several dangers
of such a course are readily apparent.10 7 First, the municipality may
be prompted to revoke exemption not because there is an absence of
103 See Hansmann, supra note i, at 62 & n.30.
104 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, sura note 60, at 219-20.
105 See Schaffer & Fox, supra note 65, at 223-24, 226 (discussing the AHA's arguments
between 1969 and i9go on behalf of nonprofit hospitals).
106 Two nonprofit hospitals submitted amicus briefs on behalf of the hospital in the Inter-
mountain litigation. See supra p. 1631. A for-profit hospital sought to enter a brief on behalf
of the county. See Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 267 (Utah
1985).
107 See Frug, The City, supra note 102, at 1o67 (noting the common fear that local power
results in corruption, local selfishness, and local abuse of power).
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charity, but because the benefits provided by the organization are not
localized. For example, the benefits of a national university are spread
broadly, but the full cost of the property tax exemption is borne by
the city or town where the university is located. '0 8 Second, opposition
to exempt status could arise from a desire to keep a particular social
service out of the community - the "not in my backyard" syndrome.
Examples include drug treatment clinics and homeless shelters. Fi-
nally, there is the danger that a pernicious local bias may prompt a
community to revoke the exemption of a group that promote the public
good. A municipality may object to certain political goals or the
racial, ethnic, or religious background of a group or its beneficiaries.
For example, a gay rights group may be targeted for revocation
because a majority of the community objects to the group's mission.
Because of these dangers, courts must carefully evaluate the ar-
guments of both the locality and those of the entity seeking exemption.
The party seeking exemption bears the burden of proving that it meets
the criteria set forth in the relevant statutory or constitutional provi-
sion. 10 9 Thus, there should be a rebuttable presumption that all of
the income or property of any organization is taxable. When a mu-
nicipality acts to revoke property tax exemption, this presumption
should be strengthened. 110 To rebut this presumption, the organiza-
tion could demonstrate its charitable nature by showing the monetary
value of the charity it contributes in relation to its gross revenues and
the value of the exemption."' Alternatively, an organization might
make the more generalized claim that it confers a "public benefit." In
revoking an organization's exemption, the municipality has made the
judgment that the benefit the organization confers is insufficient to
merit exemption. To rebut the municipality's position, an organization
may point to one of the three dangers outlined above. The judge
should examine the facts to determine if any of these factors appear
to have motivated the municipality's decision to revoke the exemption.
If, in the court's judgment, none are applicable, the revocation should
be upheld. In addition to the courts, Congress and the IRS must also
pay close attention to local tax policy initiatives and closely scrutinize
the charitable qualities of those institutions that are consistently tar-
geted for taxation at the municipal level." 2
108 See Premo, supra note 93, at 14 (noting how the burden of tax exemption for Harvard
and MIT falls heavily on the city of Cambridge).
109 See, e.g., Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d io68, 1071 (6th Cir. 1974)
("An organization which seeks to obtain exempt status .. bears a heavy burden to prove that
it satisfies all the requirements of the exemption statute.").
110 See Thomas R. Barker, Reexamining the 5o(c)(3) Exemption of Hospitals as Charitable
Organizations, 48 TAx NOTES 339, 350 (1990).
111 For suggestions of reasonable requirements for charity care, see sources cited infra note
130.
112 See Barker, supra note iio, at 350 (asserting that the revocation of a state, county or
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E. The Example of Nonprofit Hospitals
A vigorous debate on the merits of tax exemption for nonprofit
hospitals has raged since the late i96os. Recently, many commenta-
tors have argued against the exemption. 113 Historically, hospitals were
perceived as charitable institutions. Although they accepted money
from paying patients, they also treated the poor free of charge. With
changes in medical technology and the advent of Medicaid and Med-
icare, however, the charitable role played by hospitals has diminished
in importance. Indeed, some have asserted that hospitals should no
longer be required to treat the indigent to merit exemption. Con-
versely, others argue that less reason remains for subsidizing hospitals
through exemptions because the government directly subsidizes indi-
gent and elderly hospital care. 114 However, because millions of Amer-
icans are uninsured, a need for charitable hospital care persists, and
many advocates seek to impose that burden on hospitals that wish to
maintain their tax-exempt status.
The tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals has commanded attention
because of the amount of revenue at stake1 15 and the dominance of
nonprofit hospitals in the nonprofit sector.1 1 6 Furthermore, most non-
profit hospitals operate on a commercial basis, with limited reliance
on donations, and often compete with for-profit hospitals located in
the same geographic region.
The tax status of nonprofit hospitals impacts dramatically on the
nation's health-care policy.1 17 Many of those who object to extending
the tax exemption do so because of the inhumane treatment nonprofit
hospitals give to the poor and the uninsured. These hospitals com-
monly admit only patients with a demonstrated ability to pay either
through insurance, Medicaid, or Medicare. 118 Some hospitals also
local property tax exemption should be a strong indication to the IRS that the hospital is not
benefitting the community).
113 See, e.g., Hall & Colombo, supra note i, at 409-io; Hansmann, supra note i, at 89.
114 See Hall & Colombo, supra note i, at 407-o8; Claudia Coates, Penny-Pinching Pittsburgh
Saves Big in Small Increments, CHI. TRIB. (Zone W.), Sept. 29, 1991, at 9A (paraphrasing a
City Finance Director as reasoning that "since the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, many
hospitals are reimbursed for work they once performed as charity").
I's The estimated value of exemptions, federal, state, and local, for nonprofit hospitals is
$8.5 billion annually. See John Copeland & Gabriel Rudney, Tax Subsidies for Not-For-Profit
Hospitals, 46 TAx NOTES 1559, 1565 (i99o). The General Accounting Office estimates that the
federal government loses $4.5 billion a year as a result of tax exemptions for nonprofit hospitals.
See Robert Pear, Tax Exemptions of Nonprofit Hospitals Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. is,
199o, at Ai, B17.
116 Hospitals account for almost one-half of the revenues of all charitable organizations,
although they constitute only i% of such organizations. See Pear, supra note 11S, at B17.
117 See Schaffer & Fox, supra note 65, at 218 (arguing that the IRS made health-care policy
in promulgating Revenue Ruling 69-545).
115 See Hall & Colombo, supra note r, at 319 (noting that nonprofit hospitals have "increas-
ingly taken on the appearance of business enterprises by serving mostly paying patients").
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engage in patient dumping, in which uninsured emergency patients
are transferred to city and county hospitals to avoid the costs of
indigent care. 119
i. Current Law and Hospital Tax Exemption. - Section 501(c)(3)
does not explicitly define health care as an exempt purpose. There-
fore, nonprofit hospitals must qualify for federal income tax exemption
under the catch-all charitable purpose provision of section 5o1(c)(3).
The IRS has consistently redefined the requirements that hospitals
must meet in order to qualify for exemption, allowing for progressively
lower levels of charitable service for maintaining tax-exempt status.
In 1956, the IRS issued a revenue ruling setting forth the requirements
for hospitals to qualify under the charitable definition of section
501(c)(3). 1 2 0 The ruling stated that a hospital "must be operated to
the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for services
rendered."'1 2 1 In 1969, another ruling changed this standard to a
"community benefit standard."1 22 The new ruling stated that the
promotion of health was a purpose "deemed beneficial to the com-
munity as a whole" according the general law of charity. 123 Under
the 1969 ruling, a hospital satisfied the charitable definition if it had
an emergency room open to all persons, regardless of their ability to
pay, and provided care on an nondiscriminatory basis to paying pa-
tients. 124
2. The Challenge to Hospital Exemption. - In Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon,125 a plaintiff group led by
welfare rights organizations challenged the validity of the 1969 ruling,
and argued that Congress had intended "charitable" to require the
provision of relief for the poor. A federal district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiffs.' 26 In a 2-i decision, the appellate
court reversed and upheld the IRS's broad interpretation of the term
"charitable."'1 27 The Supreme Court vacated the ruling on procedural
119 See Lisa M. Enfield & David P. Sklar, Patient Dumping in the Hospital Emergency
Department: Renewed Interest in an Old Problem, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 561, 561-62 (I988)
(discussing the adverse effects of "patient dumping"); Schaffer & Fox, supra note 65, at 217.
120 See Rev. Rul. 56-x85, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203.
121 Id.
122 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, ii8.
123 See id.
124 See id. In 1983, the IRS issued a ruling that further relaxed the charitable standard.
It stated that a nonprofit hospital qualifies for tax exemption under § 5o0(c)(3), even if it has
no emergency room, when a state health planning agency has determined that operation of an
emergency room would be "unnecessary and duplicative." See Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B.
94. The effect was to extend tax exemption to specialty hospitals, such as cancer hospitals. See
id. at 95.
125 5o6 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
126 See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Schultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 388 (D.D.C. 1973).
127 See Eastern Kentucky, 506 F.2d at 1287-9o. For a critique of the appellate court's
reasoning, see Hall & Colombo, supra note i, at 322-23.
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grounds, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
IRS revenue ruling. 128
Although the legal challenge to the IRS hospital rulings ultimately
failed, some members of Congress have recognized the concerns raised
by the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky. They believe that government
resources should be devoted only to those activities that offer a clear
public benefit. Consequently, these congressmen have sought to place
on the hospitals the burden of demonstrating that they provide suffi-
cient public benefits to merit tax exemption. In i9i, two bills were
introduced in the Congress that would impose more stringent require-
ments for nonprofit hospitals seeking tax-exempt status. 129 Both bills
would require such hospitals to provide specified amounts of charity
care and community benefits in order to receive exemption.130
States have administered the exemption of hospitals from property
taxes in a fashion similar to the federal government's administration
of the income tax exemption. Some state statutes specifically exempt
nonprofit hospitals, while hospitals in other states must rely on the
"charitable" catch-all category of the property tax exemption. 13 1
Local taxing authorities have become increasingly aggressive in
challenging the tax-exempt status of nonprofit hospitals located within
their jurisdictions. 13 2 Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc. 133 was the first case in which a state court upheld a municipality's
revocation of the tax exemption of a nonprofit hospital on the grounds
that the hospital failed to demonstrate that it was operating for a
charitable purpose. 134 Tax authorities in other states have tried to
revoke or deny property tax exemptions from hospitals without suc-
cess. 13 5 However, the Pennsylvania courts have been more receptive
128 See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).
129 See H.R. 790, xo2d Cong., ist Sess. (i99i); H.R. 1374, 102d Cong., ist Sess. (1991).
130 House Resolution 790, introduced by Repr. Roybal, would require hospitals to provide
charity care equal to 5o% of the value of the exemption and community benefits equal to 35%
of the value of the exemption. See H.R. 790, Io2d Cong., xst Sess. 1-3 (1991). House Resolution
1374 was introduced by Repr. Donnelly, and would require qualifying hospitals to devote 5%
of its revenue to supporting charitable services. See H.R. 1374, 102d Cong., ist Sess. 1-7
(1991).
131 See WELLFORD & GALLAGHER, supra note 51, at 125.
132 See Pear, supra note IIS, at B17 ("Local officials have tried to revoke tax exemptions
from nonprofit hospitals in at least 12 states."); see also Burlington, Vt., Divided By Mayor's
Tax Mission, supra note 97, at 56 ("[The mayor] has launched a campaign to force both [Medical
Center Hospital of Vermont] and the [University of Vermont] to make payments to the city in
lieu of taxes . . ").
133 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).
134 See id. at 278-79. Intermountain later entered into an informal agreement with the
county to establish what Intermountain would do to maintain its exemption. See Martin
Tolchin, Hospitals Use Charity to Fend off Tax Collectors, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1988, at C3 .
135 In Vermont and Tennessee, efforts to revoke exemption based on the arguments which
were successful in Intermountain failed. See Medical Ctr. of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 566
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to the kinds of arguments put forth by the litigating county in Inter-
mountain. Although an earlier decision that upheld the exempt status
of a nonprofit hospital on the basis of its open door policy remains
good law,13 6 a later decision was more demanding for a health-related
institution. 137 In Erie v. Hamot Medical Center,138 the state court
upheld the revocation of a hospital's property tax exemption because
the hospital did not prove that it provided sufficient charitable care. 139
Similarly, another revocation of a health-related institution's exempt
status has been upheld.' 40 In Texas, a more innovative suit is pend-
ing. Instead of revoking the property tax exemption, the attorney
general has sued to force a major hospital to provide more charitable
care to comply with the attorney general's definition of a nonprofit
hospital. 141
Although many have recognized that the government does not get
its money's worth by exempting nonprofit hospitals from taxation, 14 2
little has changed at the federal level. Only on the local level are
arguments against the broad exemption for nonprofit hospitals leading
to changes in tax policy.
3. Applying the Proposed Analysis to the Case of Hospitals. -
Typically, in deciding cases on tax exemption for hospitals, state
judges rely on precedent and traditional categories of tax-exempt ac-
tivity. 143 They reason that, because operating a hospital is a charitable
activity, all nonprofit hospitals are per se exempt. Most state courts,
however, have not recognized that changes have occurred in the our
health care delivery and payment systems that render inaccurate and
obsolete the traditional designation of hospitals as per se charitable.14 4
Even those courts that have recognized changes in the health care
system have broadened the category of charitable institutions to in-
clude hospitals, rather than concluding that many nonprofit hospitals
no longer operate as charitable institutions. 145 Many local tax au-
A.2d. 1352, 1354-55 (Vt. 1989); Downtown Hosp. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization, 760
S.W.2d. 954, 957-58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
136 West Allegheny Hosp. v. Allegheny Cty., 455 A.2d. 1170 (Pa. 1982).
137 See Hospital Utilization Project v. Pennsylvania, 487 A.2d. 13o6 (Pa. 1985).
138 No. 1319, 1992 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 9, 1992).
139 See id. at *9-'11.
140 See In re Pittsburgh NMR Institute, 577 A.2d 220 (Pa. Commw. Ct. i9go).
141 See Gary Taylor, Hospital Sued in Novel Law Suit: Charity Begins in Court?, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. i8, i991, at 3.
142 See, e.g., Copeland & Rudney, supra note 115, at 1576 (arguing that the exemption of
nonprofit hospitals should be reconsidered by Congress because the current subsidy is inequitable
and inefficient).
143 See, e.g., Downtown Hosp. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization, 76o S.W.2d 954, 956
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
144 See supra p. 1629.
14S See Medical Ctr. of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 566 A.2d 1352, 1355 (Vt. 1989) (noting
sociological changes but expanding the conception of charitable). The IRS also has redefined
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thorities, by contrast, have recognized the changes in the health care
industry and have determined that hospitals not actually providing
charitable care do not relieve a government burden, and thus are not
charitable. 146
If a municipality revokes the property tax exemption for a non-
profit hospital within its jurisdiction, and if the hospital sues in state
court to have its exempt status restored, a proper analysis would
proceed as follows. The hospital should have the burden of proving
that it is a charitable institution. It could meet this burden through
a variety of means. First, the hospital could demonstrate that the
monetary value of the services it provides to the community without
compensation exceeds a threshold level. 147 The congressional propos-
als referred to above offer guidance in defining a reasonable level of
charitable care sufficient to justify exemption. 148 Second, the hospital
can claim that through its services it confers a public benefit. 149 This
claim should be treated as suspect, however, because many studies
have shown that there is little difference in quality and cost between
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. 150 Furthermore, the municipality
may have concluded that the public benefit conferred is insufficient
to merit exemption. Because these community benefits are intangible,
and cannot be quantified, the municipality's judgment should trump
the hospital's. The hospital should be taxed unless it can demonstrate
that it provides benefits that are distributed beyond the confines of
the taxing district, that its charitable activities impose social costs to
which the community particularly objects, or that it serves a disfa-
vored or underrepresented class. In the case of hospitals, none of
these three saving factors commonly apply.
F. Conclusion
The tax exemption for nonprofits raises profound questions of
public policy. Because exemption is the equivalent of a subsidy, it is
vital to determine to which endeavors limited government resources
should be allocated. Abstract theories that attempt to distinguish
those organizations that deserve subsidy are bound to prove unsatis-
factory. Focusing on change at the local level should lead to a better
the scope of the exemption to fit traditional categories. See Hall & Colombo, supra note i, at
322-23. Federal courts have done the same. See Hansmann, supra note I, at 57-58 & n.16;
Mark A. Hall, Theories of Hospital Tax Exemption io (i991) (unpublished manuscript on file
at the Harvard Law School Library).
146 See Coates, supra note 114, at 9A.
147 A mere showing of an "open door" policy without actual provision of free care should
not suffice to meet the hospital's burden.
14S See supra note 130.
149 See Hall, supra note 145, at 25-26.
130 See id. at 32 (noting several studies showing little difference in performance between for-
profit and nonprofit hospitals).
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